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I. INTRODUCTION 
My goal in this article is to offer some reflections on jurisdictional 
conflict stimulated by Professor Posch1 and on jurisdictional equilibration 
stimulated by Professor Silberman.2 Thus, having brought to bear on the 
understanding of jurisdictional conflict an account of the etiology and 
current dilemmas of American jurisdictional jurisprudence, I will assess 
the roles and prospects of two jurisdictional equilibration devices—the 
Latin twins, forum non conveniens and lis pendens—in resolving such 
conflict, with special attention to international business disputes. 
φ This article is based on a presentation made at the Conference on Transatlantic Business 
Transactions—Choice of Law, Jurisdiction and Judgments, which was held in Barcelona, Spain, 
June 1-3, 2003. The Conference was co-sponsored by the Association of American Law Schools and 
the European Law Faculties Association. 
* David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of Pennsylvania. I have profited 
from the discussions at the conference where this paper was first presented and from comments on a 
subsequent draft by Samuel Baumgartner, Geoffrey Hazard, Kim Lane Scheppele, David Shapiro, 
Linda Silberman, Catherine Struve, and Arthur von Mehren. 
     1.      See Willibald Posch, Resolving Business Disputes Through Litigation or Other 
Alternatives: The Effects of Jurisdictional Rules and Recognition Practice, 26 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 363 
(2004). 
2. See Linda J. Silberman, The Impact of Jurisdictional Rules and Recognition Practice on 
International Business Transactions: The U.S. Regime, 26 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 327 (2004) [hereinafter 
The Impact of Jurisdictional Rules]. 
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II. JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICT 
Professor Posch’s article lays firmly at the door of disagreements 
about appropriate rules of adjudicatory jurisdiction the difficulties that 
delegates to the Hague Conference have experienced in crafting a global 
convention on jurisdiction and judgments.3 In his view, certain grounds of 
jurisdiction accepted in the United States but regarded as exorbitant under 
the Brussels Convention and its replacement regulation, combined with 
the American Rule on cost (including attorney’s fee) shifting, the 
availability of contingency fee representation, and the right to jury trial in 
civil cases, prompt overreaching by entrepreneurial American plaintiff’s 
lawyers and risk aversion in foreign defendants. The latter are therefore 
often led either to settle rather than to litigate once a lawsuit has been 
commenced in the United States, or to anticipate and try to avoid that 
dilemma through a forum-selection (including an arbitration) clause. 
According to this account, the differences in jurisdictional 
conceptions that have prevented agreement at The Hague overwhelm other 
differences in the rules and practices applicable in the United States and 
the E.U. countries that Professor Posch discusses, including differences 
regarding forum-selection clauses and the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments.4
One need not agree with Professor Posch’s account to find interesting 
the conclusion that what he calls “sociological differences” are probably 
more important than legal differences to an understanding of the 
jurisdictional conflict he describes. For present purposes, I would 
highlight one difference that might be so conceived and that has obvious 
legal impact. 
In many developed countries in the western world, the State directly 
affords—or provides administrative or other mechanisms that afford— 
assistance to those who have been injured to a far greater degree than does 
the United States, where, as a result, litigation picks up the slack. The 
same is true of mechanisms to vindicate important regulatory interests. 
These differences reflect, in turn, fundamental differences in attitudes 
3. Posch, supra note 1 at 364-66. For a recent and deeply learned discussion of the proposed 
convention that sets it in the comparative context that is necessary both to understand the existing 
obstacles and to make progress overcoming them, see SAMUEL P. BAUMGARTNER, THE PROPOSED 
HAGUE CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: TRANS-ATLANTIC LAWMAKING 
FOR TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION (2003). 
4. Of course, as my colleague, Geoffrey Hazard, points out, one can take the view that 
“[t]he differences in procedure, especially the cost rule, discovery and jury trial, overwhelm almost 
everything. So much so that jurisdiction is almost everything.” E-mail from Geoffrey Hazard, 
Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School, to Stephen Burbank, Professor of Law, 
University of Pennsylvania Law School (Sept. 9, 2003) (on file with author). 
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toward the proper role of the State and of private initiative in ordering 
social life, with predictable effects on general attitudes toward not only 
litigation but also the status quo and how, if at all, it should be altered.5
However regrettable the contingency fee, the American Rule on cost-
shifting, and the institution of the jury trial in civil cases may appear to a 
European, they are logical incidents of a system that distrusts government 
and leans heavily on private litigation to compensate for injury and to 
enforce important social norms, but that does not provide legal aid that is 
worthy of the name.6 It is not only the self-interest of entrepreneurial 
American plaintiff’s lawyers that prompts resistance to attempts to reduce 
the availability of litigation forums in the United States when an American 
alleges injury for which a foreign enterprise may be legally responsible or 
where the activities of that foreign enterprise are alleged to trigger an 
American regulatory interest. Forced to pursue vindication thousands of 
miles from home, and without alternative (that is, non-litigation) means of 
vindication, our putative American plaintiff might lose not only favorable 
substantive law but that which experience suggests may be more important 
in many cases, to wit, the ability to secure representation and to develop 
evidence necessary to establish liability (discovery). 
That said, it is probably equally important for this discussion to note 
that the current, plaintiff-friendly regime of jurisdictional rules in the 
United States is a relatively recent phenomenon. For much of our history 
jurisdictional law and the nature of the society whose needs it served 
constrained forum shopping. “[T]he greater latitude to assert jurisdiction 
afforded the states by International Shoe and its progeny dramatically 
enhanced the opportunities for interstate forum shopping and, coupled 
with loose federal control of state choice of law, the incentives of both 
litigants and state courts to run a race to judgment, creating a [domestic] 
market for litigation . . . .”7 Moreover, just as United States courts in effect 
assimilated internationally foreign judgments to interstate judgments for 
5. See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 
(2001); see also Stephen B. Burbank, The Roles of Litigation, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 705, 711 (2002) 
(“private litigation here has long served roles that in other countries are addressed through social 
insurance, administrative law, and the like”). 
6. See Paul D. Carrington, Self-Deregulation, the “National Policy” of the Supreme Court, 
3 NEV. L.J. 259, 260-64 (2003). Any doubt on that score as to the contingency fee should have 
disappeared when our friends in England, who for more than a century derided contingency fee 
litigation as “litigation on spec,” adopted its genteel cousin, the conditional fee, as a direct result of 
their inability adequately to fund legal aid. See Burbank, The Roles of Litigation, supra note 5, at 
710-11. 
7. Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, the Proposed Hague Convention and 
Progress in National Law, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 203, 210 (2001) (citations omitted) [hereinafter 
Jurisdictional Equilibration]. 
388 HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 26:2 
 
                                                          
purposes of recognition and enforcement,8 so have they assimilated 
internationally foreign actors to domestic actors for purposes of applying 
jurisdictional rules.9 That has meant that, with the increase in global 
commerce following the Second World War, the market for litigation—
enabled in large part by the contemporaneous expansion of acceptable 
jurisdictional bases in the United States—became a global market as 
well.10
The use of American jurisdictional law to draw the world into our 
courts has cast in relief failures of imagination that are evident even in 
domestic cases. One such failure has been that of the Supreme Court to 
take a dynamic and comparative view of jurisdiction when adjusting 
federal constitutional limits on its exercise. Thus, for example, although 
the Court used the vehicle of International Shoe11 to abandon fictions that 
had previously bridged the gap between a perceived territorial imperative 
and the needs of an increasingly mobile society, it has never made clear 
whether there is a continuing need, and hence a proper place, in the new 
order for the fiction of corporate presence in a state through the conduct of 
systematic and continuous business activities.12 There is an argument to be 
8. Id. at 207-08. In seeking an explanation for the assimilation of internationally foreign 
judgments to interstate judgments for purposes of recognition and enforcement, I have noted that “the 
history of both interjurisdictional recognition and jurisdictional equilibration since the founding [of the 
United States] has been a history of accommodating the perceived needs of sovereignty under 
constitutional language long on aspiration but short on details,” and I have suggested that it was 
“easier for such a country and its constituent states to treat other countries like other constituent states 
than it was or would be for countries without a history of and experience in accommodating internal 
sovereign claims.” Id. at 208. 
9. See Stephen B. Burbank, The World in Our Courts, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1456, 1470-71 
(1991) (reviewing GARY B. BORN WITH DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN 
UNITED STATES COURTS: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS (1989)). 
Asahi was an international case, and its international dimensions properly influenced the 
outcome. But the case provided a vehicle for the reascension of a mode of constitutional 
analysis that had been repudiated in deeds if not in words. The “modification” it initiated 
is not one that—judging from the opinions—the Justices embracing it intended for 
application only in international cases, and it has not been so restricted in the lower 
courts in the years since the case was decided. 
Id. (citations omitted); see also infra text accompanying note 21 (arguing that this disposition to 
assimilate has been reinforced by the impulse of modern American procedural law to apply the same 
rules to all cases). 
10. As suggested by the remarks of Professor Virgos at the conference, we now have a 
global market not just in litigation but, more broadly, in dispute resolution. 
11. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
12. See Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: End of the Century or Beginning of 
the Millennium?, 7 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 111, 119 (1999) [hereinafter Jurisdiction to Adjudicate]; 
Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: General Theories Compared and Evaluated, 63 
B.U. L. REV. 279, 299-300 (1983) [hereinafter Adjudicatory Jurisdiction]. The Perkins decision casts 
little if any light because the foreign defendant in that case did essentially all of its limited business 
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made that, with the adoption of grounds of activity-based or specific 
jurisdiction that International Shoe invited, and given the continued 
acceptance of domicile (including state of incorporation) as a basis of 
general jurisdiction, “doing business” jurisdiction should not be permitted, 
or should be substantially scaled back, in litigation involving domestic 
(U.S.) defendants.13
The same argument is harder to carry in a case involving a foreign 
defendant precisely because such a defendant has no domicile or seat in 
the United States. Yet, to say that a defendant is subject to jurisdiction 
because, and only because, it is doing systematic and continuous business 
in this country implies that the claim does not arise out of that activity and 
hence that there is lacking the sort of connection between the underlying 
transaction or occurrence and the forum that is usually assured by grounds 
of specific jurisdiction in the United States and, to a lesser extent, by rules 
of “category-specific jurisdiction”14 common in many foreign legal 
systems. It is one thing to say that a corporation should not be heard to 
complain if sued on an unrelated claim in the place that is its legal home.15 
during and immediately after World War II in Ohio, and because there may not have been an 
alternative forum available to the plaintiff. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 
447-49 (1952); see also Silberman, The Impact of Jurisdictional Rules, supra note 2, at 333 
(discussing Perkins). The Helicopteros decision, although not repudiating this ground of general 
jurisdiction, found that it could not be exercised constitutionally on the facts of the case. See 
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415-19 (1984). 
13. Cf. Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 610 n.1 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
plurality opinion) (suggesting that, as a constitutional matter, general jurisdiction on the basis of doing 
business may be restricted to corporations). 
14. ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ADJUDICATORY 
AUTHORITY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE DOCTRINES, POLICIES 
AND PRACTICES OF COMMON- AND CIVIL-LAW SYSTEMS 64 (2003). 
Analysis of claims of adjudicatory authority in terms of general and specific jurisdiction 
leaves out of account a third type which can be called category-specific jurisdiction. The 
adjudicatory authority asserted is general in the sense that, unlike specific jurisdiction, 
the particular claims to be litigated need not be linked to the forum but, unlike general 
jurisdiction, the adjudicatory authority claimed extends only to controversies of a 
particular juridical character, for example contractual or tortious (delictual) claims. 
Id. The author notes that section 29 of the German Code of Civil Procedure makes a “claim of 
category-specific jurisdiction by the place of performance [that] covers not only disputes respecting 
the fact or manner of the contract’s performance but also disputes respecting the contract’s creation.” 
Id. at 65. 
15. See Burbank, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate, supra note 12, at 118. 
The states of the United States have a shared interest in providing at least one place 
where a person or corporation can be sued—a jurisdictional “headquarters”—an interest 
that is shared by plaintiffs. In light of these interests, a person or corporation that has 
purposefully established such a relationship with a state cannot properly complain that 
an assertion of jurisdiction is so unfair as to be unconstitutional. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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It is quite another endlessly to proliferate such homes—to debase the 
notion of a jurisdictional “headquarters”16—in the process neglecting the 
fact that the original fiction was “presence,” not “domicile.” 
Until such time as the Court does approach the constitutional inquiry 
from a dynamic and comparative perspective, however, the best hope for 
moderation (other than the forum non conveniens doctrine, to which I turn 
below) may be the application to this ground of general jurisdiction of a 
second order reasonableness analysis now firmly part of the constitutional 
evaluation of grounds of specific jurisdiction—analysis that, its 
provenance suggests, is particularly apt in a case involving a foreign 
defendant.17 Such analysis has the capacity to distinguish the lot of an 
individual from that of a corporate (as well as that of a domestic from that 
of a foreign) litigant, plaintiff or defendant, and hence (even if sub 
silentio) to accommodate the sociological facts of litigation life to which I 
have referred.18 Certainly, it could put an end to the worst excesses of 
“doing business” jurisdiction in transnational litigation, namely those 
occurring when the contacts of a domestic subsidiary (or related entity) are 
imputed to the foreign defendant under an alter ego or agency theory.19
16. Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 625 (1914) (“The very meaning of domicil is the 
technically pre-eminent headquarters that every person is compelled to have in order that certain rights 
and duties that have been attached to it by law may be determined.”); see Burbank, Jurisdiction to 
Adjudicate, supra note 12, at 118; see also Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction 
to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1137, 1179 (1966). 
17. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (denying 
specific jurisdiction over a foreign defendant); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 
F.3d 560 (2d Cir. 1996) (denying general jurisdiction over a domestic defendant). 
18. See von Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction, supra note 12, at 313-22; cf. Silberman, The 
Impact of Jurisdictional Rules, supra note 2, at 332 (“[I]t would be in keeping with the jurisdictional 
standard of reasonableness for courts to take into account at the constitutional level such factors as the 
relative strength of the parties’ bargaining positions.”). Professor Silberman has elsewhere proposed 
an interesting compromise to bridge the wide gap that has separated negotiators at The Hague when 
dealing with doing business jurisdiction. In place of the prohibition on assertions of such jurisdiction 
in the 1999 Hague draft, she suggests: 
Article 18 could be modified to prohibit jurisdiction on the basis of the carrying on of the 
commercial activity by the defendant when the activity did not give rise to the claim 
“except where the defendant has a branch office or where the defendant’s activity in the 
forum is evidence of a substantial presence there, and the plaintiff is habitually resident 
in the forum state.” 
Linda J. Silberman, Can the Hague Judgments Project be Saved?: A Perspective from the United 
States, in A GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE HAGUE 177 (John 
J. Barcelo III & Kevin M. Clermont eds., 2002) (citation omitted). 
19. See, e.g., Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int’l, 227 N.E.2d 851 (1967). Compare Professor 
Posch’s discussion of activity-based jurisdiction over a “branch, agency or other establishment” of a 
foreign corporation. Posch, supra note 1, at 369. In an interesting forthcoming article, Professor 
Hoffman argues that the supposed locus classicus of the jurisdictional alter ego doctrine, Cannon Mfg. 
Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925), has been consistently and egregiously misinterpreted 
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This discussion brings to light another failure of imagination in 
American jurisdictional law, or at least federal constitutional law, which 
unfortunately has largely displaced state law in fact and in American legal 
thinking about jurisdiction:20 the failure to recognize a possible need for 
different rules depending on the characteristics of the litigants. 
Th[e] disposition to assimilate international to domestic 
interjurisdictional cases has been reinforced by the very 
powerful impulse of modern American procedural law, 
including for these purposes choice of law, to apply the same 
rules to all cases. American courts have pursued domestic 
doctrinal uniformity even when doing so resulted in 
international disuniformity, as in the interpretation of treaties.21
Yet, as Professor Posch reminds us, one should not neglect the 
possibility that a sociological explanation may cast as much light on this 
phenomenon as does a legal explanation. Indeed, it would be surprising if 
the same foundational attitudes regarding the proper roles of the State and 
of private initiative in social ordering were not operating in and on the 
rules of adjudicatory jurisdiction. 
It was perhaps easier for continental jurisdictional jurisprudence, with 
its focus on the links between a claim or dispute and the forum, to 
anticipate a need for, and to create, special rules for consumers and 
employees, than it was for its American constitutional counterpart, with its 
focus on the relationship between the defendant, the forum, and the 
litigation.22 Yet, the logic behind that thought quickly confronts the failure 
of contemporary American jurisdictional law to protect those who are 
predictably disadvantaged where the likelihood of such disadvantage is 
plain for all to see, to wit, when a case involves a contractual choice-of-
and is not, in fact, authority for imputing the jurisdictionally relevant affiliations of one corporation to 
another. See Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Constructing the Case Against Vicarious Jurisdiction, 152 U. 
PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004). 
20. This phenomenon of linking state to federal constitutional law itself reflects a failure of 
imagination and one that may entail a variety of costs, arising from: (1) a race to the bottom (when due 
process is conceived as a floor); (2) normative leveling (when it is conceived as a bed); (3) uncertainty 
as a result of fact dependency and indeterminacy (in either situation); and (4) “the loss of comparative 
perspective that may occur when due process is formulated knowing that it will serve as the source of 
rules for state law.” See Burbank, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate, supra note 12, at 113-14, 118. 
21. Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, supra note 7, at 208-09 (citation omitted). 
22. See von Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction, supra note 12, at 317. The “purposeful 
availment” aspect of minimum contacts analysis only crudely effects such a distinction. Of course, 
states remain free to distinguish among litigants in fashioning their rules of jurisdiction, but many of 
them have simply abdicated to federal constitutional law, explicitly or implicitly, thus sacrificing good 
policy to the desire not to disadvantage local litigants and lawyers. See supra note 20. For a discussion 
of rules that prefer plaintiffs in order to equalize litigation capacity, see VON MEHREN, supra note 14, 
at 201-03. 
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forum (including arbitration) clause. 
The Supreme Court’s approach to choice-of-court clauses in Carnival 
Cruise Lines23 is redolent of freedom of contract notions that, however 
much one might like to confine them to an age when there was no indoor 
plumbing, evidently reflect an enduring strain of American thought bound 
up with belief in individual freedom and responsibility and a fear of 
paternalistic government. The Court’s approach to the interpretation of the 
Federal Arbitration Act, in turn, deprives the states of the United States of 
the power to protect those thought to be vulnerable to overreaching unless 
those states are willing to change their entire law of contracts in order to 
address particular problems arising out of contracts to arbitrate.24
Ironies abound here, including the fact that American law regarding 
both choice-of-court clauses and arbitration clauses underwent 
fundamental change in response to the perceived requirements of 
international commerce, with those changes then translated to domestic 
commerce.25 Another irony lies in the possibility that the supposed 
traditional hostility of American courts to (pre-dispute) arbitration clauses 
reflected rather, at least in some quarters, concern about overreaching of 
those less advantaged.26 Yet a third irony appears when one realizes that 
some states have tried to distinguish among disputants in their rules 
concerning the enforcement of arbitration clauses but have been thwarted 
by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the supposed requirements of the 
Federal Arbitration Act.27 The fourth irony, and the one that is most 
germane to the subject of this Symposium, is that even the laissez-faire 
standard of Carnival Cruise Lines and similar cases may afford too much 
discretion to defeat a choice of court made by parties both of which have 
adequate means to protect themselves, as the parties to international 
23. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
24. See, e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987) (“Thus state law, whether of 
legislative or judicial origin, is applicable if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, 
revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally. A state-law principle that takes its meaning 
precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with this 
requirement. . . .”). On the other hand, there may be a silver lining, as courts confronted by 
breathtaking overreaching (re)invigorate the contract doctrine of unconscionability. See, e.g., 
Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, 341 F.3d 256, 264 (3d Cir. 2003); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 
F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2002); Paul D. Carrington, Unconscionable Lawyers, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 
361, 373-79 (2002). 
25. See Burbank, The World in Our Courts, supra note 9, at 1471-73. 
26. See Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. 
REV. 331, 339-40 (1997). 
27. See id. at 379-91; Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1984); Perry, 482 
U.S. at 490-91; supra text accompanying note 24. 
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business transactions typically do.28 This is not surprising because the 
standard must accommodate all cases. 
Thus, American courts have either (as to consumer contracts) traveled 
from one extreme to another or (as to business-to-business contracts) not 
traveled far enough, in both situations failing to note the different ways in 
which the ground is staked out in laws of many other countries that one 
might have hoped the phenomenon of international litigation, and the 
invitation to comparative law that it presents, would have brought to their 
attention. 
III. JURISDICTIONAL EQUILIBRATION 
A. Forum Non Conveniens 
One aspect of American jurisdictional law that has famously departed 
from the norm of refusing to distinguish among litigants lies in the 
differential treatment of American and foreign plaintiffs for purposes of 
the application of the forum non conveniens doctrine. I would be happy to 
see that distinction in its current form disappear—indeed, I have argued 
that it should disappear—if only because its treatment in the 1999 Hague 
draft signals that other countries regard it as invidious.29 But in my view 
that is a small point at which to stick in the reformation of a jurisdictional 
equilibration device that has lost its way. 
However ancient its lineage, forum non conveniens as a general tool 
of jurisdictional equilibration dates to the 1940s, to the very period, that is, 
when the Supreme Court was empowering states to broaden their 
jurisdictional reach. Originally (re)invigorated to deal with wholly 
domestic litigation (in a very big country), forum non conveniens quickly 
became relevant in federal litigation only in cases where the alternative 
forum was outside of the United States.30 Moreover, although that is not 
28. See Ronald A. Brand, Forum Selection and Forum Rejection in US Courts: One 
Rationale for a Global Choice of Court Convention, in REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR PETER NORTH 51, 63 (James Fawcett ed. 2002); 
Posch, supra note 1, at 375-76. 
29. See Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, supra note 7, at 212, 240-42. There is irony 
here as well, as those who liken American courts to lights drawing to them moths from around the 
world would have us regard as invidious discrimination an attempt to control the swarm by privileging 
the claims of American plaintiffs. See id. at 241. 
30. See id. at 211-12; Martin Davies, Time to Change the Federal Forum Non Conveniens 
Analysis, 77 TUL. L. REV. 309, 313 (2002). In his comments on a draft of this article, David Shapiro 
inquired whether the doctrine had ever been employed to dismiss a case in favor of a domestic forum 
to which transfer could not be made under 28 U.S.C. §1404 because the alternative forum was not a 
court in which the suit “might have been brought” originally. See e-mail from David Shapiro, 
Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, to Stephen Burbank, Professor of Law, University of 
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true of all candidates for a forum non conveniens dismissal in state 
courts,31 federal law has continued to provide the model for most states’ 
law on the subject.32
There is one aspect of the differential treatment of domestic and 
foreign plaintiffs for these purposes that reveals what is fundamentally 
wrong with the doctrine: it was built, or at least is sustained, on fictions, if 
not hypocrisy. Thus, the justification given for such differential treatment 
is that a U.S. forum chosen by a domestic plaintiff is likely to be 
convenient whereas no such confidence is warranted as to a U.S. forum 
chosen by a foreign plaintiff.33 The notion that in this world of global 
commerce, transport, and communications, the lawyers for plaintiffs, 
domestic or foreign, are usually more interested in convenience than they 
are in litigation advantage is equaled in naiveté only by the notion that it is 
the quest for convenience that usually prompts defense lawyers to file 
forum non conveniens motions.34
Similarly, the notion that an adequate alternative forum is a necessary 
condition for a forum non conveniens dismissal cannot be taken seriously. 
That is not only because the Supreme Court has made clear that the 
Pennsylvania Law School (Sept. 10, 2003) (on file with author). I am not aware of such a case. 
Professor Shapiro’s question brings to mind, however, the phenomenon of a case that is filed in the 
courts of a state that either has not embraced the doctrine or that applies a version more protective of 
jurisdiction than federal law, and that is subsequently removed to federal court and dismissed. See, 
e.g., Sibaja v. Dow Chem. Co., 757 F.2d 1215 (11th Cir. 1985). On the assumption that refiling in 
state court would only lead (again) to removal and dismissal, I have always regarded such a case as 
strong evidence of the dubiety of the view, taken in Sibaja and many other cases, that federal forum 
non conveniens law can be applied in a diversity case (in which state substantive law will be applied). 
American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443 (1994), should not be thought to speak to the question. 
Formally, that case was different because it involved litigation in state court. More importantly, what 
Justice Kennedy referred to in his dissent as the “reverse-Erie metaphor” is not just “not a sure guide.” 
Id. at 467. It is thoroughly misleading. See Stephen B. Burbank, Federal Judgments Law: Sources of 
Authority and Sources of Rules, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1551, 1557 n.39 (1992) [hereinafter Federal 
Judgments Law]. Of course, if this view were to prevail, it would strengthen the argument for federal 
statutory control of forum non conveniens in international cases. See Linda J. Silberman, 
Developments in Jurisdiction and Forum Non Conveniens in International Litigation: Thoughts on 
Reform and a Proposal for a Uniform Standard, 28 TEX. INT’L L. J. 501, 523-25 (1993) [hereinafter 
Developments in Jurisdiction]; Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, supra note 7, at 242-46. 
31. American courts, unlike other common law courts that employ forum non conveniens, 
typically dismiss rather than stay the case, one of the aspects of American practice that should be 
changed. See Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, supra note 7, at 243. 
32. See Davies, supra note 30, at 315-16. 
33. See Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 261 (1981); Burbank, Jurisdictional 
Equilibration, supra note 7, at 212. 
34. See, e.g., Silberman, Developments in Jurisdiction, supra note 30, at 525-26; Davies, 
supra note 30, at 324-26. Moreover, as well described by Professor Davies, “[g]aining access to 
foreign evidence has become much easier since 1947, as international litigation law and practice have 
developed.” Davies, supra note 30, at 324. 
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remedy provided by an “adequate” forum means only one that is not “so 
clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all.”35 
American courts have no coherent or consistent view of the role or weight, 
if any, that should be given in forum non conveniens analysis to the 
constellation of legal rules and arrangements that determines whether a 
putative plaintiff has real, as opposed to theoretical, access to court and to 
means of proof essential to gain a remedy.36
The most disturbing fiction of all, however, is the notion that forum 
non conveniens analysis is (and should be) impervious to regulatory 
interest triggered by policies underlying rules of substantive law and those 
ancillary rules that in this country are thought necessary to its vindication. 
That, of course, is a possible message of the Supreme Court’s Piper 
decision, where the prospect of even a substantial change in the governing 
substantive law was said to be worthy of little weight.37 It is a message 
that is difficult (but not impossible) to square with the Court’s articulation 
of relevant “public interest” factors and one that, in any event, lower 
courts have had great difficulty heeding.38 For good reason. 
American legal thought and practice have traditionally regarded 
jurisdiction and choice of law as different problems requiring discrete 
analysis.39 That traditional posture came under pressure in two Supreme 
Court decisions, where distinguished justices argued unsuccessfully that a 
state’s interest in applying its law to a dispute should count for something 
in assessing the constitutionality of an assertion of jurisdiction in its 
courts.40 It is in any event seriously problematic in situations where the 
choice-of-law process does not work, as may often be true in cases where 
the alternative forum is foreign (particularly when the dispute implicates 
regulatory statutes).41 Still, specific jurisdiction at the constitutional level 
35. Piper, 454 U.S. at 254. 
36. See Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, supra note 7, at 242-43; Davies, supra note 
30, at 346-48. 
37. See Piper, 454 U.S. at 247. 
38. See Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, supra note 7, at 212; Davies, supra note 30, 
at 358-60. It is ironic that, in the type of case for which forum non conveniens was dusted off and 
extended in 1947, domestic diversity litigation in federal court, see supra text accompanying note 30, 
“a change in the governing substantive law was held to be impermissible in . . . cases that could be 
transferred under the mechanism enacted in 1948.” Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, supra note 
7, at 212 (citation omitted). 
39. See, e.g., VON MEHREN, supra note 14, at 36-38. 
40. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 258-60 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting); Shaffer v. 
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 223-28 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
41. See von Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction, supra note 12, at 323-31. For an exception, 
see Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, supra note 7, at 245 n.197 (discussing Article 137(1) of the 
Swiss Private International Law Act). 
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is likely to guarantee at least the potential for regulatory interest in the 
forum. 
In a domestic case, when the courts of a state—the law of which 
could constitutionally be applied to a dispute—are found not to have 
jurisdiction to adjudicate, the case can usually be refiled in another state, 
where there is still a possibility that the law of the first state will be 
applied, where, if not, the substantive law is likely to be similar, and 
where in any event the plaintiff will have available the same or very 
similar arrangements for gaining access to court and the proof necessary to 
establishing her claim (if it can be established at all). The same is true if a 
state court dismisses a domestic case within its jurisdiction under the 
forum non conveniens doctrine. 
In a transnational case, on the other hand, both a dismissal for lack of 
jurisdiction and a forum non conveniens dismissal portend, as we have 
seen, not just the application of substantive law that may be very different 
(and far less favorable to the plaintiff), but, as an anterior matter, barriers 
to bringing or pursuing suit that are often insuperable, at least for an 
individual plaintiff (i.e., natural person). That is a cost that American 
interests must bear when the defect is lack of jurisdiction. But it is more 
obviously a self-inflicted wound—inflicted, moreover, by institutions with 
only a tenuous claim to power42—when there is jurisdiction but the 
domestic forum is challenged as inconvenient. 
One cannot reach a judgment whether American jurisdictional law is 
exorbitant without a normative measuring rod. Comparative jurisdictional 
inquiry suggests as an appropriate measure the extent to which rules of 
jurisdiction tend to assure the existence of a regulatory interest in the 
underlying dispute. By that standard, certain jurisdictional rules currently 
applied in American courts are exorbitant. Particularly in a world where 
litigation convenience is a predominating concern chiefly of courts, it 
should be an acknowledged purpose of forum non conveniens doctrine to 
achieve the balance that is lacking in American law because of both (1) 
the traditional separation of jurisdiction and choice of law and (2) 
judgment recognition standards that ignore the merits and the law applied 
except when manifestly contrary to public policy. That, in fact, is what 
many courts are doing today, when, although they speak of convenience 
and inconvenience, their eyes seem fixed on the presence or absence of a 
domestic regulatory interest.43
42. See Burbank, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate, supra note 12, at 120. 
43. See Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, supra note 7, at 212. 
According to this view, the failure of American law to integrate jurisdictional and choice 
of law doctrine, together with a recognition practice that permits neither a choice of law 
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It remains to bring that consideration to center stage, a process that 
reflection about both the sociological differences and the hypocrisy of 
current law discussed above can only facilitate. When that occurs, it will 
be apparent that differential treatment of domestic and foreign plaintiffs, 
far from constituting invidious discrimination, can represent the rational 
and consistent implementation of an equilibration device that resists the 
dismissal of cases in which there is likely to be a domestic regulatory 
interest.44 Thinking about the doctrine in that way should also prompt a 
reassessment of even such a hallowed jurisdictional ground as domicile (or 
habitual residence),45 as it should of the illegitimate child of a transitional 
fiction: “doing business” jurisdiction. Finally, giving regulatory interest its 
proper role in the forum non conveniens analysis could put an end to 
situations in which courts dismiss cases brought under regulatory statutes 
such as the antitrust or securities laws on forum non conveniens grounds 
even though there is both adjudicatory jurisdiction and jurisdiction to 
prescribe.46
B. Lis Pendens 
Turning finally to lis pendens, I have little to add to Professor 
Silberman’s discussion,47 a fact that causes me no regret because that 
discussion, and the lis pendens provisions of the proposed federal statute 
included in it,48 draw heavily on my previous work in this area.49 As 
test nor reexamination of the merits, renders it important to consider domestic regulatory 
interests before jurisdiction is surrendered. Jurisdictional standards that more broadly 
implemented domestic regulatory interests should diminish the need for this 
equilibration device. 
Id. at 236-37 (citations omitted). 
44. “But we are all, I hope, discriminating, and thus . . . capable of distinguishing 
differences in treatment that are prompted by the consistent application of factors that are nationality-
neutral from differences that are causally tied to the consideration of nationality (or habitual 
residence).” Id. at 241. See Davies, supra note 30, at 375-76. 
45. See Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, supra note 7, at 236. 
American jurisdictional law does not have a monopoly on overreaching[,] and . . . 
limitations of foresight can call forth a similar need in other systems. Even such a 
hallowed jurisdictional ground as domicile may benefit from the equilibration that forum 
non conveniens or some similar device can provide, and functionally similar 
jurisdictional equilibration may already occur without invocation of the dreaded Latin 
phrase. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
46. See id. at 245. For a discussion of forum non conveniens in federal statutory cases, see 
Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman & Keith A. Rowley, Forum Non Conveniens Analysis in Federal Statutory 
Cases, 49 EMORY L.J. 1137 (2000). 
47. See Silberman, The Impact of Jurisdictional Rules, supra note 2, at 338-44, 356-57. 
48. See AMERICAN LAW INST., INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS PROJECT 
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developed there, this promising means of mediating actual transnational 
jurisdictional conflict has had a checkered history in the federal courts of 
the United States, owing to yet another failure of imagination, as well as to 
the indifference of the Supreme Court. Here the failure of imagination is 
to treat the courts of Spain, for example, as either other federal courts or 
the courts of a state of the United States, which is how they must be 
treated so long as different federal circuits resort to different domestic 
models, neither of which is suitable for transplant and one of which is 
incoherent in its original context.50 The American Law Institute (ALI) 
proposed statute would bring order out of this chaos in a thoughtful, 
measured, and uniform way; its lis pendens provisions are suitably narrow 
in scope51 and sufficiently flexible to prevent injustice through strategic 
manipulation.52
Like Professor Silberman, I harbor no illusions that an ALI statute, 
including this feature in particular, would quickly be embraced. Indeed, 
there is reason to believe that the lis pendens provisions may have 
contributed to the surprising lack of enthusiasm for the project in its 
statutory form evinced at the ALI meetings in May 2003 by a member of 
the United States delegation to the Hague Conference, who expressed 
“ambivalence” in such a one-sided way as to suggest that the word has a 
special meaning in Washington, D.C. 
One possible reason for opposition to uniform federal provisions 
requiring, in carefully prescribed circumstances, deference to parallel 
litigation first filed abroad is the feeling that—at least in the absence of 
reciprocity on the subject and in light of the realities of modern 
international forum shopping—the United States should not add to the 
handicap of a generous law of recognition and enforcement by refusing to 
allow domestic litigants and courts to run a race to judgment. As I have 
previously observed: 
This argument is not without force. Yet, some of the costs of 
parallel litigation are visited on domestic parties and 
domestic courts. Moreover, the general faith in other legal 
systems evidenced by the United States’ generous judgment 
recognition practice surely has a firmer basis today than it did 
§11 (Tentative Draft 2003) [hereinafter ALI Tentative Draft]. 
49. See Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, supra note 7. I am an adviser to the ALI 
project in question. 
50. See id. at 213-15. 
51. The provision applies only when “a proceeding involving the same parties and the same 
subject matter has previously been brought and is pending in the courts of a foreign country.” See ALI 
Tentative Draft, supra note 48, §11(a); Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, supra note 7, at 233-34. 
52. See ALI Tentative Draft, supra note 48, §11(b). 
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100 years ago, as does the concept of an international system 
whose needs should be considered in the formulation and 
application of national law. These considerations suggest that 
an attempt to rely on a normative principle of dual 
jurisdiction would ring hollow. Unless the goal were to take 
back part of the territory surrendered by international 
recognition practice, such a crude rule would not be 
necessary to protect the interests that, according to that 
practice, are relevant. And such a goal would be hard to 
defend at a time when “[t]he need for courts to rely on each 
other in order to serve justice has been recognized in an 
increasing number of international civil litigation cases.”53
To this response I would add only that the force of any general 
opposition to federal statutory lis pendens provisions is sapped by clever 
aspects of the ALI draft statute, according to which the judgment of a 
court that did not reciprocate by respecting a first-filed American action 
(that was not stayed or dismissed), or the proceedings in which were 
brought in order to frustrate adjudication in a more appropriate U.S. court, 
need not be recognized or enforced.54
Another possible reason for ambivalence toward the ALI project in its 
statutory form, whether tied to the lis pendens provisions or more broadly 
inspired, is the fear that, at some point, it could weaken the bargaining 
position of the United States or otherwise make our negotiators’ lives 
more difficult in pursuing the remains of the day at The Hague, which are 
a modest but potentially significant effort to salvage from a decade of 
effort a double convention on jurisdiction and judgments in business-to-
business transactions involving a choice-of-court clause.55
It seems to me a wholly adequate response to such a concern that, if it 
were frankly articulated and supported with particulars, there would be 
ample time to see whether adjustments in the ALI draft statute were 
appropriate. An adjustment that seems to me sensible in any event is to 
make explicit that the proposed statutory lis pendens regime privileges a 
suit filed in a court that is designated as the exclusive forum for dispute 
resolution in a valid choice of court clause, whether or not that suit is filed 
first, with a corollary provision permitting non-recognition of a judgment 
53. Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, supra note 7, at 233 (citation omitted). 
54. See ALI Tentative Draft, supra note 48, §5(b)(iv)-(v); Silberman, The Impact of 
Jurisdictional Rules, supra note 2, at 356-57. 
55. See Hague Conference on Private Int’l Law, Draft on Exclusive Choice of Court 
Agreements, HccH Work. Doc. 49e (Dec. 2003), ftp://ftp.hcch.net/doc/workdoc49e.pdf [hereinafter 
Hague Draft]; Brand, supra note 28. 
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of a court that proceeded in derogation of such a clause.56
IV. CONCLUSION 
Finding a path through existing jurisdictional conflict will not be 
easy. The sociological facts that underlie that conflict are not likely to 
change soon in consequential ways. In large part for that reason, it seems 
safe to conclude that the ambitious effort to craft a global convention on 
jurisdiction and judgments cannot succeed in the near term. Some 
observers hope that the much narrower project now occupying the 
attention of the negotiators at The Hague (business-to-business choice-of-
court clauses) may one day serve as a springboard again to seek broader 
compromises. Yet, if that effort were made, the next generation of 
negotiators would surely confront abiding differences among litigants—in 
the role that litigation plays in their lives and their capacity to participate 
in the global litigation (or dispute resolution) market— suggesting that the 
board may have too little spring. 
If this is correct, our hopes may have to rest on gradual (and formally 
unilateral) rapprochement, with the tools of jurisdictional equilibration 
even more important in a world without a treaty than they would have 
been to the success of any such effort.57 Those hopes can be realized only 
if lawmakers, including courts, are open to adjusting their private 
international law rules respecting the public adjudication (and private 
resolution) of disputes so that the law, while always reflecting its place in 
a web of social institutions, is as dynamic and receptive to foreign 
influence as are the societies in which we live. 
 
56. Attention should be paid to possible exceptions, such as that reflected in the current 
Hague draft where “the parties are habitually resident [only] in the State of the court seised, and the 
relationship of the parties and all other elements relevant to the dispute, other than the agreement, are 
connected with that State.” See Hague Draft, supra note 55, art. 5(f). 
57. See Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, supra note 7, at 206 (jurisdictional 
equilibration devices are “critically important to the success of any treaty that may be concluded”). 
Bilateral treaties are, of course, another alternative. The experience of a failed attempt to enter into 
such a treaty with the United Kingdom, “from a comparative-law perspective our most likely treaty 
partner,” is not encouraging, however. Burbank, Federal Judgments Law, supra note 30, at 1572. 
